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Competition in DoD Acquisitions
 Competition is a driving force in the US economy
 It forces organizations to improve quality, innovate, reduce 
costs, and focus on customer needs
 There are many differences between the commercial and 
defense markets
 However, as a general rule, competition has the same 
effects in defense acquisitions
 None-the-less, introducing competition into DoD acquisitions is not 
always straightforward
 Barriers include:  industry consolidation (horizontally and vertically); 
increased resistance to globalization (“Buy American”); product 
specialization; often increased up-front costs; and reluctance to 
change suppliers (even if they are not performing)
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Eight Potential Forms of Competition and Results 
Usually Found
1. Compete for Development—winner “buys in” (with performance, 
schedule, and cost “optimism”) 
 later results in lower performance, schedule slips, and costs growths 
(“optimize the changes clause”)
2. Competition during Development—introduces innovation to 
meet performance, schedule, and costs targets; and reduce risks
 especially effective if given a production cost target and flexibility to 
do systems engineering and to use proven technology for block I
3. Compete for Production—forces extreme “optimism” on prices 
bid (since win or lose all)
 proposed learning curves not achieved (curves often even go up)
 sole-source pricing of all changes; and an incentive to create them
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Initial low bid is likely be Illusory
With sole-source production the Prime has a monopoly 
on all change orders and an incentive to create them
With sole-source production the Prime has a monopoly 




Eight Potential Forms of Competition and Results 
Usually Found (cont)
4. Competition during Production—forces continuous process and product 
innovation, resulting in:
 Higher performance at lower costs
 Steeper learning curves achieved by both suppliers
5. Compete during Sustainment — Support usually is a sole-source follow-
on—but if reliability is poor and/or support costs are high—introducing 
competition can have big impacts.
6. Competition for Services
 Services should not be about the lowest hourly rate (but, they often are); quality 
matters (i.e. “best value”) but harder to predict and to measure
7. Competition during Services
 Best to award multiple service providers and compare cost and results (services 
now 60% of DoD acquisitions)
8. “Competitive Sourcing” (Public/Private Competitions) e.g. via A-76 — Results 





 Learning curve theory predicts that as a firm 
becomes more experienced, and increases volume, 
it becomes more efficient. 
 However, most learning curve data has been 
gathered in a competitive environment (based 
largely on commercial data).
 Empirically, competitive pressure increases 
steepness of learning curve; but, in the absence of 
competition, learning curves are, at best, relatively 
flat.






















Competition produces counterintuitive result – second source 
demonstrates steeper learning curve than initial producer; then first 
source becomes competitive, and both have steeper learning curves.













































Source:  International Armaments Cooperation in a Era of Coalition Security, Report of the Defense Science Board, August 1996
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Cost Growth in Competitive Dual-Source Programs 















 Production quantity assumptions and estimation changes
 Engineering, test, and development changes
 ILS changes, and spares and support changes not attributable to
post-milestone II discretionary decisions
 Schedule slips attributable to technical problems
 Other changes not attributable to discretionary changes
* CAIG called these “Mistakes” and Defined as:
Source: OSD CAIG Cost Growth Study, May 2001
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The Great Engine War—Realized benefits
(Pitted P&W and G.E to supply different engines for F-15s and F-16s)
 Improved Reliability 
 Shop visit rate per 1000 engine flight hours is half the pre-competition engines
 Scheduled depot return increased from 900 cycle to 4000 cycles
 Improved contractor responsiveness, as well as investments to improve efficiency, 
upgrade manufacturing capability, and other capital investments to reduce costs
and improve quality
 Lower cost warranties--significant savings gained from the original P&W 
warranty cost
 Dual lower-tier suppliers and hence operational flexibility and an enlarged
industrial base
 Considerable protection from production disruption
 Estimated $2 – 3 billion in net savings (then-year dollars) over the 20 year 
lifecycle of the aircraft
Both new engines proved to be more capable, durable, and 
supportable, and at lower costs than the current engine
Both new engines proved to be more capable, durable, and 
supportable, and at lower costs than the current engine
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Competition During Production: JSF 
Engines NPV Break-Even Analysis
Source: Testimony of Michael Sullivan before  the House Armed Services Committee, Subcommittees on Air and Land Forces,  and Seapower and 
Expeditionary Forces, March 22, 2007
70/30 A w ard
Break-E ven P o in t =  10 .3  P ercentage Savings












































P o in t 
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The Tomahawk Experience — Realized 
Benefits
 G.D. would not assume 
responsibility for missile 
reliability so Gov. 
introduced second source
 System Reliability improved 
from approx 80% to 97%
 This increase attributed to 
P.M. initiated corrective 
action as well as 
competitive pressure
 P.M, GD/C, and PA&E 
studies all concluded that 
dual-sourcing saved the 
government money, while 
improving performance
Sources: Birkler and Large, Dual-Source Procurement in the Tomahawk Program, RAND, 1990, John Birkler et al, Assessing Competitive 









































































Neither GD or 
MDAC ready in 
84, first 
competitive 





Summary of Commercial Aircraft 
Produced in a Competitive Environment
 Of these programs, all 
showed a decrease
between 2% and 27%
 Overall simple average 













Source:  “Historical Lease Rates/Values 1971-2000" http://www.aircraft-values.co.uk/, 
*Cost Growth Factor is based 
on actual cost incurred
May 14, 2008
14
Cost-Growth Factors* for DoD Aircraft 
Programs with no Production Competition
 Of these programs most 
showed an increase between 
25% and 104%
 Two programs showed a very 
modest decrease















*Cost Growth Factor is based on 
actual cost incurred vs. program 
baseline 
Source:  John Birkler et al, Assessing Competitive Strategies for the Joint Strike Fighter, RAND Corp., 2001
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 Increase development 
times
 Decrease production 
efficiency
 Remove learning curve 
incentive
 Discourage innovation






























































Shift total production curve 
to lower efficient rates
Shift total production curve 
to lower efficient rates
Production Efficiency 
 The theoretical argument usually 
given  against competitive dual-
sourcing is that the two firms 
cannot achieve “economically 
efficient production rates.”
 The counter to this is a “shifting of 
the total production curve” to lower 
efficient rates.
 Lockheed-Martin reduced their 
Trident D5 missile production rate 
from 60/year to 12/year and 
lowered the unit cost by changing 
their production curve.
Yet, in two recent cases (the second engine for the F-35, and the Tanker 
acquisition of a commercial aircraft) the Air Force has chosen a sole-
source (down-select) vs. dual-source (continuous competition)—thus 
giving up higher performance at net lower cost for sole-source 
“promises.”
Yet, in two recent cases (the second engine for the F-35, and the Tanker 
acquisition of a commercial aircraft) the Air Force has chosen a sole-
source (down-select) vs. dual-source (continuous competition)—thus 





Availability and Response Time Comparisons
F-14 LANTIRN
H-60 Avionics
F/A-18 Stores Mgmt System
Tires
APU
Material Availability* Logistics Response Time**
Navy Program Pre-PBL Post-PBL Pre-PBL Post-PBL
73% 90% 56.9 Days 5 Days
71% 85% 52.7 Days 8 Days
98%65% 42.6 Days 2 Days CONUS7 Days OCONUS
81% 98% 28.9 Days 2 Days CONUS4 Days OCONUS
65% 90% 35 Days 6.5 Days
*Klevan, Paul, NAVICP, UID Program Manager Workshop Briefing, 5 May 2005




 Work is not inherently governmental
 Work can be performed better, faster, cheaper by the 
private sector
 Allows for public sector to compete with private sector for 
work
 Benefits: 
 Government very often wins (but benefits realized no matter who 
wins)
 Better performance at lower cost
 Forcing factor for “leaning” the existing process
 Creates competition in environments that are not normally 
exposed to market forces
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Results of Public/Private Competitions (A-76) Cost 
Comparisons: 1978 - 1994
510 $470 27%
733 $560 36%
Marine Corps 39 $23 34%
806 $411 30%





































Competitive Sourcing: What Happens to Federal Employees? Jacques S. 
Gansler and William Lucyshyn, October 2004 
*MEO= Most Efficient Organization (as proposed by government workers)
** Even for the competitions won by the contractor, the MEOs proposed decreases of 28% in 
the FTE headcount  
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The government employee MEO won both competitions with 
dramatic proposed savings
The government employee MEO won both competitions with 
dramatic proposed savings
*The source selection results were released in Aug 2004
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Competitive Sourcing Long-term Demonstrated Results


















¨ Expected Savings (as bid by winner – government or private)                           35%
¨ Observed Savings (realized results, including scope & quantity changes)         24%
¨ Effective Savings (realized results on same scope & quantity)  34%
Long run Costs and Performance 
Effects of Competitive Sourcing
CNA,  February 2001
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Public vs. Private Competition for Services:
Performance Improvements 1st – Then Cost Savings
Competitive Sourcing of Public Transportation—Transportation 
authorities award contracts to the lowest responsible and responsive 
provider—public or private.
Service reliability increased 300%, 
complaints reduced by 75%80-96Los Angeles
Service levels increased 243%
Service levels increased 38%
Service levels increased 47%












Cost savings have ranged from 20% to 60% compared to the costs of non-
competitive services that were replaced
Cost savings have ranged from 20% to 60% compared to the costs of non-




 The available evidence supports that 
competition  will:
 Encourage innovation and higher quality 
 Reduce production cost significantly
 Reduce life cycle costs significantly  
 Reduce cost growth throughout the program
 Strengthen the industrial base
 Improve the quality of services
Competition is the stated law, and is common in 
most speeches; it should be the common practice
Co petition is the stated law, and is co on in 
ost speeches; it should be the co on practice
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Recommendations to Increase 
Competition
 Utilize Competition During All Phases
 Or provide the potential for cost control
 Take Advantage of Globalization
 Transatlantic competitive/cooperative 
R&D/production
 Expand Small Business Innovation Research 
(SBIR) Program
 Expand Defense Industrial Base
 Incentivize firms to enter defense business






Competition for Services—NASA Desktop Services
 NASA’ approach had been to use 
NASA employees to maintain desktop 
assets
 No way to track costs, no 
standardization, not tracking service 
quality
 NASA’s Outsourcing Desktop Initiative 
(ODIN) transferred the responsibility 
for providing and managing the vast 
majority of NASA's desktop, server, 
and intra-Center communication 
assets to the private sector.
 ODIN Goals
 Cut desktop computing costs
 Increase service quality
 Achieve interoperability and 
standardization
 Focus NASA IT employees on core 
mission
 NASA’ approach had been to use 
NASA employees to maintain desktop 
assets
 No way to track costs, no 
standardization, not tracking service 
quality
 NASA’s Outsourcing Desktop Initiative 
(ODIN) transferred the responsibility 
for providing and managing the vast 
majority of NASA's desktop, server, 
and intra-Center communication 
assets to the private sector.
 ODIN Goals
 Cut desktop computing costs
 Increase service quality
 Achieve interoperability and 
standardization
 Focus NASA IT employees on core 
mission
 Performance (by winning 
contractor)
 Exceeded required service levels
 Service Delivery 98%
 Availability 98%
 Customer Satisfaction – ranges 
from 90-95% 
 Hardware/software were 
standardized at each center
 Interoperability and security were 
much improved
 Cost— from no adequate way to 
allocate IT costs to firm fixed price
 Performance (by winning 
contractor)
 Exceeded required service levels
 Service Delivery 98%
 Availability 98%
 Customer Satisfaction – ranges 
from 90-95% 
 Hardware/software were 
standardized at each center
 Interoperability and security were 
much improved
 Cost— from no adequate way to 
allocate IT costs to firm fixed price
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Why does Government use its Monopsony Power so 
Sparingly
 DoD Is not a unitary decision maker—acquisition spread among services, elements 
of services, program offices (and even some help from Congress)
 All compete for annual budget share, resources, national security turf
 Single supplier can exploit differences
 Long-term government relationships with contractor
 Information asymmetry favors contractors
 “Promises” that this time the sole-source learning curves will be realized; which the 
government wants to believe
 Perception of costing more for two sources
 Many contradictory (and competing) government objectives
 Buying for lowest cost or best value
 For competition 
 To protect “industrial base”—including jobs
 For innovation
 To act fairly
 Often it is small “Savings” taken up-front, at the expense of large cost savings later
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Analysis of Government and Defense Industry –
Monopsony and Oligopoly Power Struggle
 The Barriers to Entry are High 
 Suppliers Have Moderately 
Intense Rivalry
 2-3 players of the same size
 “Lumpy” Procurements
 Usually all or nothing
 Uncertain Market Growth Rate
 There is a low threat of product 
substitution
 As a result, the government 
only has medium power
As long as there are at least two perceived viable competitors the 
Government can hold its own--but it takes determined leadership
